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STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated. 78-2(a)-2(e),

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
In this criminal case, the Court of Appeals has authority to
decide the appeal based upon Utah Code Annotated, 78-2(a)-2(e),
which grants to the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction in
final orders involving criminal cases less than a First Degree
Felony.

Also see

Rule 3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of

Appeals concerning this Appeal in a criminal case.
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Defendants were charged in separate Information in the
Circuit Court in the State of Utah, Washington County St. George
Department with three counts under the Utah Controlled Substances
Act.

The Defendant Salvatore Anthony Calcaterra was charged in

Count One with possession of controlled Substances a Second Degree
Felony in that he possessed cocaine and had previously convicted
a prior offense.

In Count Two he was charge with possession of

marijuana a Class B Misdemeanor and in Count Three a possession of
drug paraphernalia a Class Misdemeanor. The Defendant Kirk Dudley
in a separate information was charged with the same charges but
the First Count was a Third Degree Felony because there was no
enhancemental alleged on the basis of a prior conviction.

The

Defendants filed a Notice of Hearing and the matter came for
hearing on Wednesday, April 24, 1991, at the conclusion of the
hearing the Court entered Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
which are attached here as the Exhibit One in the Appendix.
After the denial the Motion to Suppress the Defendants entered into
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a written agreement to change their plea while reserving the right
to Appeal pursuant to the prior decision of this Court. That Plea
Agreement was approved by the Court and the Defendant, Salvatore
Calcaterra, plead guilty to the Third Degree Felony and the
Defendant, Kirk Dudley, plead guilty to a Class A Misdemeanor.
After sentencing which took place on January 6, 1992, the Order was
Stayed pending this Appeal and both Defendant's were released from
custody.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the court err in denying the Motion to Suppress in

light of th€» evidence at the hearing that the Defendants were
detained after being issued a speeding citation?
2.

Did the ruling of the Court denying the Motion to

Suppress deny each of the sentence their constitutional rights
under the Utah State constitution and the Fourth and Fourteen
Amendments to the United States Constitution?
3.

Did the Court err in requiring the Defendants to answer

questions at the Motion to Suppress concerning their knowledge of
the controlled substances even though the Defendant took the stand
to testify

concerning

the factual issues on the Motion to

Suppress.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Th€» Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides that M[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons,

2

houses, papers, and effect, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated....11.
2.

Section

Fourteen

of

Article

I

of

the

Utah

State

Constitution states as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures shall not be
violated...."
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment in a criminal case which is
was taken

after the Defendants entered

a conditional

Appeal

preserving their right to an Appeal while entering a no contest
plea after the Motion to Suppress was granted by the Court.

The

Defendants filed a Motion pursuant to the case of State v. Sery,
785 P. 2d 1935 ( Utah App. 1988) to allow the Defendants to each
plea no contest and to approve the conditional plea permitting and
reserving the suppression issue of an Appeal to the Court of
Appeals.

This Motion was made and approved by the Court.

The

Defendant Salvatore Calcaterra was sentenced on January 6, 1992,
for a Third Degree Felony and the Defendant Kirk Dudley on January
6, 1992, for a class A Misdemeanor. The sentence in both cases has
been stayed pending this Appeal.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appeal was filed within thirty days from the date of the
final order and this is the first appeal taken in this proceedings
even though a prior appeal was dismissed due to the fact that the
Notice of Appeal was filed between the date of Sentencing and the
3

date that the final judgment was entered necessitating the filing
of the subsequent appeal. However there has been no prior appeals
decisions by this Court be either of the Defendants.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The Defendant, Salvatore Calcaterra, was sentenced to 0 to 5
years in the State Prison and fined $5,000.00. That Sentence was
stayed pending the serving 30 days jail and the payment of a fine
of $1,150.00 as well as the usual conditions for probation. The
Defendant, Kirk Dudley, was sentenced to 15 days in the Washington
County Jail and fined $175.00 for the Class A Misdemeanor offense.
RELEVANT FACTS
WITH THE CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
The Defendants submits the follows facts were introduced as
the hearing however, the Court entered separate Findings of Facts
which

are

contained

in Exhibit

One to the appendix

thereof

Defendant,

Anthony

submitted hereto.
On

December

9,

1990,

the

Salvatore

Calcaterra, was driving his white, 1985 Buick, four-door vehicle
in which Kirk Dudley was the passenger

and the vehicle was

northbound on Interstate 15, south of St. George, approximately
five miles from the Utah border, (Transcript 4/24/91 page 7) .
Trooper James D. Lloyd of the Utah Highway Patrol was on
traffic patrol and was traveling
southbound on Interstate 15.

in a marked patrol vehicle

The Officer conducted a moving a

radar check which indicated that Calcaterra vehicle was speeding
at 78 miles per hour in a 60 mile per hour zone and he stopped the
4

vehicle at milepost 6 on Interstate 15, at approximately 4:45 p.m.,
near the Bloomington Exit. (Tr. 8)
The trooper told Mr. Calcaterra that he had been stopped for
speeding, advised the driver of the speed, and asked for his
driver's license and vehicle registration.
The highway patrol trooper took the information from the
driver which was a

drivers license and a temporary Colorado

registration and returned to his vehicle to "issue him a citation
and did come computer checks and things" (Tr. 9 Line 11)

The

Officer claimed that when he first approached the car he could
smell a "strong perfume odor and I also could smell an intermittent
odor of what smelled like marijuana to me". (Tr. 9) . In his patrol
1 car, the officer filed out a uniform traffic citation for
speeding and check with the El Paso Intelligence Center (E.P.I.C.)
to check Mr. Calcaterra7s name

before he returned to the vehicle

in which Mr. Calcaterra was sitting. (Tr. 10) . When the officer
returned to the vehicle after 10 minute without out a response from
E.P.I.C, Mr. Salvatore Calcaterra signed the speeding ticket, and
the officer gave Mr. Calcaterra the original speeding ticket as a
citation for the offense of speeding. (Tr. 11)
The highway patrol trooper continued to detain the vehicle and
began interrogating the driver and asking questions concerning
whether there were any weapons or drugs in the car. Mr. Calcaterra
replied that he did not have any; and, the passenger was asked the
same question by the officer and he gave the same response to the
officer. (Tr. 13).
5

Trooper Lloyd asked the driver if he could check the trunk of
the vehicle for drugs and Mr.Calcaterra said that he didn't have
any.

The Trooper asked again if he could look in the trunk and

the driver said that he could. (Tr. 13).

Mr. Calcaterra went to

the trunk area of the car and opened the trunk.

The officer

searched the trunk and did not find any contraband.
searching

he

received

information

that

his

While

dispatch

had

information, and the officer returned to his vehicle and he claims
he was told that Mr. Calcaterra has been previously arrested for
transporting cocaine in the State of Louisiana (Tr. 14) .

After

finding nothing in the trunk, the officer asked if he could search
the passenger compartment.
that

Mr.

Calcaterra

At this time, the officer testified

"just pointed

to

the

area

(indicating) and shrugged his shoulders". (Tr. 17).

like

that

Before

commencing the search, Mr. Calcaterra was patted down and checked
for weapons and ordered to step around to the front of the vehicle.
(Tr. 19) .

The passenger, Mr. Dudley, was also search for weapons

and ordered out of the vehicle and required to stand and wait in
front of the vehicle. The officer found a open container of alcohol
under the passenger seat in a paper bag and in a trash receptacle
in the front seat found a marijuana pipe and a small quality of
marijuana.
Both Mir. Dudley and Mr. Calcaterra were then according to the
officer, handcuffed and told that they were under arrest and they
were told that the officer was not sure what the charges would be
at that time. (Tr. 23) .

After another officer arrived, Trooper
6

Lloyd continued the search and found a black jacket in the back
seat in which he found cocaine.

The officer testified that the

Defendant were detained and arrested at the scene for over an hour
and his records reflected that the car was pulled overt at 4:45
p.m. and the Defendants were booked into jail at 7:30 p.m.
After the Defendants were taken from the scene, an inventory
search was performed on the vehicle and no additional controlled
substances were discovered. (Tr.26)The Defendant, Salvatore Calcaterra, testified that after
waited up to a half an hour, the officer returned to his vehicle
and handed him a citation for speeding and discussed the procedure
to mail the ticket and gave him and mailing envelope. (Tr. 39) .
He was then asked to step out of his vehicle and bring his keys in
order that the officer could search his vehicle. (Tr. 40).
While at the back of his vehicle, the officer received a
message from dispatch for the offer to return to his car.

(Tr.41) .

Mr. Calcaterra testified that when he shrugged his shoulders, he
said to the officer, "it seems like you're going to be doing
whatever you like anyway" (Tr. 42).
The passenger in the vehicle, Kirk Dudley, took the stand and
testified that the officer asked Mr. Calcaterra to get out of the
car and bring the keys to search the truck after he had given Mr.
Calcaterra, the speeding ticker.

(Tr. 49) .

He testified, that

both Defendant's were handcuffed, while standing in front of the
vehicle prior to the officer searching the interior of the vehicle
and finding the controlled substances. (Tr. 50).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In summary, the Defendants each submit that the Utah State
Highway Patrol Trooper violated the Utah State Constitution and the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
when he continued to detain the Defendants and handcuff the
Defendants after the probable cause for the traffic stop had
terminated.
undisputed

The conclusive factor in this case is based upon the
evidenced that the Defendants received a speeding

citation which was issued by the Patrol Trooper.

The officer

thereafter did not obtain consent and required the driver to open
the trunk. The Defendant submit that the trial court did not apply
the laws as clearly set forth in prior decisions of this Court.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DETENTION AFTER THE CITATION WAS
ISSUED WAS ILLEGAL.
The

Fourth Amendment

provides that

to the United

States

Constitution

ff

[t]he right of people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effect, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated
Consistent therewith, the Utah Supreme Court has held that
there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, each of which
requires

a

different

degree

of

justification

constitutionally permissible:
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
8

to

be

the person has committed or is about to commit
a crime; however, the "detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop;"
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per
curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223,
230 (5th Cir. 1984)). See also, State v. Steward. 153
Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (1991).
The

Defendant

Appellants

maintain

that

because

of

the

similarity of fact pattern, the analysis of this case should be the
same as in State v. Robinsonf 797 P.2d 431 (APP. 1990).

In

Robinson, a Utah highway patrol trooper pulled over the Defendant
on the Interstate Highway near the Salt Lake City, Utah.

The

highway patrol trooper asked for the driver's license and vehicle
registration and at that time the trooper became suspicious because
the person appeared nervous during the time he was searching for
the registration.

After determining

the van was not stolen, the

highway patrol trooper wrote out a warning citation to the driver,
or a traffic violation, and handed it to the driver.
Even though the driver had been given a citation, the troopers
continued to detain the vehicle based upon what they had observed
because the troopers were determined to ask for consent to search
the vehicle. The officers returned the van, and asked if they were
carrying any weapons, money, or narcotics, and were told "no". At
that point in time, they also asked if a search could be made of
the vehicles, and according to the troopers, the driver verbally
agreed to the request. Thereafter, the doors to the van were open
9

and there was a substantial amount of marijuana was found hidden
under a bed compartment in the back of the van.
The Utah Court of Appeals cited as authority United State v.
B. Guzman, 864 F.2d. 1512 (10th Cir. 1988) where, the Tenth Court
of Appeals had ruled that once a driver has produced a valid
license and evidence of entitlement to use of the vehicle, the
driver must be allowed to proceed without being subject to further
delay by the police for additional questioning.
temporary

detention

for

investigation,

Any further

questioning

after

fulfillment for the purpose of the initial stop was said to be
justified only if the detaining officer has reasonable suspicion
of serious criminal activity.

The

Court found in light of the

Defendant's unlawful detention after that point a violation of
their Fourth Amendment Rights.
Another reversal took place concerning a highway patrol
traffic stop in the case of State v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep.8 (Ct.
of App. 1991).
roadblock.

In Sims, Utah Highway Patrol Officers conducted a

The Court cited the case State v. Larocco, 794 P.2nd

460 (Utah 1990) indicated that warrantless searches of automobiles
are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action
before a warrant can be obtained.
In State v. Johnson, 153 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991) , the Supreme Court
suppressed a search of a backpack of a passenger in a vehicle
stopped for a license plate and registration check of the driver.
The Court found that a seizure occurred when the officer took the
defendants name and expected her to wait while he ran a warrant's
10

check. The Supreme Court stated that "the leap from asking for the
passenger's name and date of birth to running a warrants check on
her

severed

the

chain

of

rational

inference

from

specific

articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as
yet "inchoate and unparticularized hunch'" citing Terry v. Ohio.
392 U.S. 27 (1968)

The Supreme Court held that the officer's

detention of the passenger went beyond what was reasonably related
in scope to the traffic stop violating the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.
The recent decision of State v. Parker 189 U.A.R. 3 (Ct. App.
1992) (No. 910265) sets forth standards applicable in determining
the legality of the scope and duration of the stop.

In that case,

the Court of Appeals states that Utah cases establish the length
nd scope of traffic stops must be strictly tried to and justified
by the circumstances which rendered the initiation permissible
citing State v. Johnson. 805 p. 2d 761 (Utah 1991).
The County indicated that once the initial reasons for the
stop has been completed, the occupants must be allowed to proceed
without any further detention unless the officer has a reasonable
suspicion of serious criminal activity.
In Parker. the driver was stopped for speeding and illegally
detained and arrested the Defendant acted outside the "realm of
discretion granted to the police officers under the law."

State

v. Parker. 189 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (1992) at page 5.
The defendant respectfully submits that the officer in this
case detained the defendant on a "hunch" that the defendant may
11

have had possession of controlled substance. It is undisputed that
the initial stop was a traffic stop and the basis for the stop
limited the reasonable amount of time for the detention to the
point the citation was issued.
detain and

The officer instead continued to

required occupants of the vehicle pulled over for

speeding to exit the vehicle to submit to a pat down search, then
to stand in front of their care while a traffic patrol officer
investigates the possibility of drug possession.
This is not a case where the driver extended the encounter
after citation was issued.
App. Utah 1992).

State v. Castner 825 P. 2d 699 (Ct.

The driver was intentionally detained without

other evidence of reasonable cause.

C.F. State v. Grovier 808 P.

2d 133 (Ct. App 1991).
The evidence contained in the transcript of the preliminary
hearing indicated the following technique was used in this case
while the Defendant's were detained after receiving the speeding
ticket to convenience the Defendant's that he was going to search
with or without their consent:
1)

The officer asked if Mr. Calcaterra has any weapons or
any drugs. (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing page 9 ) .

2)

The officer then bent down and asked the passenger, Mr.
Dudley, if "he had used drugs" and he responded that "he
didn't" (Tr. P.H. page 9 ) .

3)

The officer asked Mr. Calcaterra if he could check the
vehicle for drugs and Mr. Calcaterra said "he didn't have
any." (Tr. P.H. 101).

4)

The officer then asked to look in the trunk and the trunk
wets searched after Mr. Calcaterra was told to take his
keys to the rear of the vehicle. (Tr. 4/24/91 page 41) .
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5)

The officer asked if he could search the passenger
compartment and Mr. Calcaterra responded that "he didn't
have any drugs," (Tr. 11).

6)

The officers asked again and Mr. Calcaterra "shrugged"
in the direction of the car. (Tr. 13).

7)

Both person were patted down and ordered to stand on the
highway in front of the vehicle and were handcuffed
according to Both Defendant's (Tr* 15 ) .

The result of this procedure was the driver indicating that
the officer should go ahead and search because "it seems like
you're going to be dong whatever you like anyway."

(Tr. 4/24/91

page 42). The officer did not have a basis to arrest and did not
have a legal reason to detain and communicate his insistence and
determination

to

search

irrespective

lack

of

consent

of

the

Defendant.
The possible of "burnt" marijuana did not justify the unlawful
detaining of the appellants.

The unsubstantiated information from

"E.P.I.C. of an alleged drug trafficking conviction is not curative
of burnt marijuana smell which is indicative of possible use of
controlled substance.

The officer did not investigate impairment

or driving under the influence. The officer was acting on an hunch
based on a profile and was unlawfully detained both Appellants in
order to act on his hunch.

The detention was unconstitutional and

requires reversal of the conviction.
II.
THE
ILLEGAL
SEARCH
CANNOT
BE
VALIDATED BY THE ALLEGED CONSENT
In State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (CT. APP. 1990), after
finding the illegal detention, the Court went on to find that the
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warrantless search of the van was not validly consented to by the
driver. The Court stated two factors to determine whether consent
to a search is lawfully obtained following police action must be
analyzed:

First, the consent must be voluntary in fact, and

second, the consent must be not be obtained by police exploitation
of the prior illegality, citing the case of State v. Arrovo, 137
Utah, ADV. REP.13 (1990). The Court indicated that the Defendants
were first questioned during the brief initially valid traffic
stop, and that once the legal basis for that stop had ended, they
were not free to leave.

The Court indicated that there was no

evidence that the driver was aware ©r was informed that he did not
have to accede to the troopers request, and at the time it was
apparent that the Defendants would be kept in custody environment
until the troopers satisfied their curiosity about the contents of
the van.

The Court went on to conclude that the State, from those

facts, had not born its burden of proving that the consent to
search the vehicle was voluntary, and that the State also failed
to establish that the consent was free from coercion.
In the case of State v. Harqraves, 153 Utah. Adv. Rep.33 (Ct.
App.

1991)

the

Court

reaffirmed

the

importance

of

the

determination concerning the basis and legality of a detention.
In that

case, the Court

considering

a Motion

to

indicated
Suppress

that the trial
should

apply

an

court

in

objective

standard determining what a reasonable person in the circumstances
of the driver would have believed at that time.

If the Court

finds that the Defendant was in custody throughout the incident,
14

the Court must determine whether the custody was lawful in its
scope and duration citing again the case of United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1980).

The Court indicated that

if the custody was unlawful the Court must determine whether the
consent to search was obtained by exploitation of that prior
illegality.
The officer in this case has admitted that the defendant's
were not free to leave.

The alleged consent would not have been

obtained but for the officers repeated interrogation and questions
to the defendants about controlled substance.

Under this fact

situation, the State cannot prove the "consent" to search was
voluntary.
III.
THE SEARCH CANNOT BE VALIDATED BY
THE NONVERBAL ALLEGED » CONSENT" OF
THE DEFENDANT.
In State v. Carter. 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1991), the Court
stated that:
Voluntariness of consent is a fact sensitive issue to be
determined by examining the totality of the circumstance.
Marshall.

See

791 P.2d at 887; Webb 790 P.2d at 82 (citing United

States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980)).

This includes

the specific characteristics of the accused and the details of the
police conduct involved.

Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 689.

In Carter, the court set forth the standard
adopted

by

the

tenth

circuit

for

determining

previously

whether

the

government had sustained its burden of proving voluntary consent.
15

(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal
and specific" and "freely and intelligently
given"; (2) the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and there
must be convincing evidence that such rights
were waived,
791 P.2d at 887-88 (quoting United States v. Abbott. 546 F.2d 883,
885 (10th Cir. 1977)); Webb. 790 P.2d at 82.
The Utah Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to what
factors may indicate a lack of coercion, including:

"1)

absence

of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence
of an exhibition of force by the officers;
search;

4)

3) a mere request to

cooperation by the owner.*.; and 5)

the absence of

deception or trick on the part of the officer."

State v*

Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980).
The scope of a consent search is limited by the breadth of the
actual consent itself.
App. 1990) •

State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct.

The Defendant in this case indicated that a search

could be made of the trunk, not the passenger compartment and items
of personal property located in the passenger compartment.
Even without
the waiver"

"every reasonable presumption against

of the continued unjustified detention and warrant

requirement, the defendants "shrugging of his shoulders" does not
constitute "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently
given" consent to search the passenger compartment while being
required to stand in front of the vehicle in the highway.

16

The

shoulder shrug was not clear and passive waiver of constitutional
rights and was a product of unlawful detention.
The Court in upholding the search as follows:
Mr. Calcaterra shrugged his shoulder, with a motion which the
officer indicated on the witness stand.
The officer took that to be consent and proceeded to search
the vehicle.
Mr. Calcaterra did not object to the search of the vehicle at
that time, nor did the passenger of the vehicle.
(See
Findings set forth in Exhibit One, Appendix).
The Court shifted the presumption against waiver by allowing
the officer to take the aiabiguous gesture as consent to search and
consent to order the Defendant's out of an to the front of the
vehicle.

He then required the driver to obiect to the orders of

the officer and communication an objection to the insistent and
demanding officer.
This ruling is inconsistent with the facts and ignores the
clear rulings of the Court. If the presumption against waiver was
correctly applied, the Motion to Suppress would have been granted.
VI.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The State had the burden of establishing that there was a
basis for the warrantless search of the vehicle and burden of
establishing a clear and unequivocal consent and waiver by the
defendants. The defendant's respectfully submit that the evidence
or findings does not support such legal conclusion that the search
was a property search.
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The trial court erroneously characterized this dentition as
a "Level II Stop".

However, the officer did not have probable

cause to arrest and was not justified in interrogating and holding
the Defendant's until the Defendant made an ambiguous gesture in
order to allow the officer to claim consent•
The lower court order denying the Motion to Suppress should
be reversed and the case remanded,
V.
ADDENDUM
Exhibit Number 1 - Findings of Fact, entered by trial court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 1992.

RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing was mailed postage prepaid to Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and a true
and correct copy to the Washington County Attorney's Office, 37
East Center, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, by depositing the same
in the U.S. Mail.
DATED this

day of August, 1992.
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Paul F. Graf #1229
Washington County Attorney
0. Brenton Rowe #2815
Deputy Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 634-5723
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR'THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF T,TAH
STATE OF UTAH,
)

PLAINTIFF,

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AN
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;

SALVATORE ANTHONY CALCATERRA, ]

CRIMINAL NO. 91150r

KIRK DUDLEY,

CRIMINAL NO. 91150"

])

DEFENDANT.

;

The above-entitled matters having been con^olida4; - -1 for
hearing on the Defendants for Motion to Suppress before the aboveentitled Court on the 24th day of April, 1991, and the State of
Utah being represented by O. Brenton Rowe, Deputy Washington County
Attorney, and Randall T. Gaither, attorney for the Defendants being
present, and the Defendants, Salvatore Anthony Calcaterra and Kirk
Dudley, being present, and the Court having received *"??timony and
exhibits in evidence, the Court having reviewed the f'les and
records herein and being fully advised in the premise^, now makes
and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on December 9, 1990, the Defendant, Salvatore
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Calcaterra was driving his vehicle, and Defendant Kirk Dudley was a
passenger, northbound on 1-15 about five miles from the Utah
border.
2.

Utah Highway Patrol Trooper James Lloyd stopped the

vehicle at about mile post six, after determining the Calcaterra
vehicle was traveling about 78 miles an hour in a zone where that
was excessive speed.
3. That Trooper Lloyd issued a citation to Mr. calcaterra for
the speeding violation.
4.

That during the process of the filling out of the citation

in his vehicle, Trooper Lloyd requested information frc™ EPIC —

El

Paso Information Center -- for the reason that he had smelled
marijuana in the vehicle as he was speaking to the driver at the
side of the vehicle prior to the issuance of the citation.
5.

That the officer did detect the odors of marijuana.

6.

The officer went back to the vehicle, issued the citation

to Mr. Calcaterra, handed him the citation and his driver's
license.
7.

That it was a normal traffic violation, with the addition

of an odor of marijuana.
8.

That the officer asked Mr. Calcaterra whether or not he

had drugs, weapons or alcohol in the vehicle.
9.
10.

Mr. Calcaterra replied that he did not.
The officer asked if he could search the trunk of the

vehicle.
11.

Mr. Calcaterra replied that he was not carrying anything.
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12.

The officer asked again if he could search the trunk of

the vehicle.
13.

Mr. Calcaterra then alighted and went around and opened

he trunk of the vehicle and allowed the officer to search.
14.

While he was engaged in the search of the trunk, the

officer received a response from the dispatcher in Cedar City to
his inquiry of EPIC, indicating that Mr. Calcaterra had a previous
history of involvement in drugs offenses.
15.

The officer returned to the vehicle and continued the

search of the trunk and found nothing of note in-the trunk.
16.

The officer asked Mr. Calcaterra about the information

that he'd received from the dispatcher relating to an alleged
conviction involving the transportation of drugs.
17.

Mr. Calcaterra explained tc the officer as he understood

it, that he had been arrested, but the charges had been dismissed.
18.

The officer then asked if he could search the interior of

the vehicle.
19.

Mr. Calcaterra indicated that he was not carrying any of

the things that the officer was looking for.
20.

The officer then inquired a second time whether he could

search the interior of the vehicle by saying "May I search the
interior of the vehicle, then?"
21.

Mr. Calcaterra shrugged his shoulders, with a motion

which the officer indicated on the witness stand,
22.

The officer took that to bo consent and proceeded to

search the vehicle.
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23.

Mr. Calcaterra did not object to the search of the

vehicle at that time, nor did the passenger of the vehicle.
24.

The officer, in searching the vehicle, determined that

there was a small quantity of marijuana and what appeared to be a
marijuana pipe hidden in a plastic receptacle on the console
portion of the vehicle.
25.

When Mr. Calcaterra determined that the drug had been

found, he approached the officer and asked for a break.
26.

The officer then handcuffed Mr. Calcaterra and placed him

under arrest.
27.

Mr. Dudley was likewise arrested and handcuffed when the

second officer arrived.
28.

The officers then proceeded to complete the search of the

vehicle and discovered other items of contraband while the
defendants were standing by handcuffed and under arrest.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the decision of the officer to investigate the smell

of marijuana was a level two detention, and the officer did have an
articulable suspicion, based upon the smell of burned marijuana
emanating from the vehicle.
2.

That the Court finds that there was consent to search the

vehicle, and the officer was reasonable, under all the
circumstances, in believing he had consent to search the trunk of
the vehicle.
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3.

That the Court finds that the consent to search the trunk

was voluntarily given•
4.

That the Court also finds that under the totality of the

circumstances, the later shrugging of the shoulders was intended as
consent to search the interior of Mr.Calcaterras vehicle, and the
officer was justified in arriving at that conclusion.
5.

That the Court finds that the actions of the officer were

reasonable, and the search was reasonable.
6.

That there is no reason to suppress the evidence, and the

motion to suppress should be denied.
DATED this

day of May, 1991.

J. PHILIP EVES
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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